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INTRODUCTION
Foreign assistance has become a controversial topic in 
recent years as many complain of the vast resources, government 
bureaucracies, research and theories committed to the cause of 
promoting social and economic development in the world's 
less-developed nations, yet with often disappointing results. 
Official development aid, such as that provided by the U.S. 
government or by multilateral donors like the United Nations, is 
usually too politicized, short-term, ill-directed, and, despite 
the humanitarian intentions, is insufficient to stimulate 
sustained growth and peace. The private sector has proven to be 
an efficient alternative channel for promoting development. It 
utilizes appropriate resources, targets different social sectors 
than official assistance reaches and, in fact, is a greater 
source of capital for development in the Third World.1 The value 
of this contribution is recognized and encouraged in U.S. policy;
The U.S. government views private enterprise and 
institutions— American and foreign— as being essential 
to economic development of developing countries.
Government assistance— while also essential— will never 
be sufficient. The financial and human resources 
needed, the attitudes and skills required, must come 
also from private initiative. A.I.D.'s partnership 
with private enterprise and institutions is therefore a 
key element in our foreign assistance program.2
There are efforts within U.S. development assistance to mobilize
these private endeavors, for example, the International Executive
3Service Corps, an organlistion of retired U.S. business 
executives who share their skills with developing country firms; 
grants to Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) which include 
not-for-profit groups and religious organizations; and the Peace 
Corps.
Within the U.S. foreign aid bureaucracy there exists a small 
independent agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), which specifically encourages the participation of 
American private enterprise in the nation's development 
assistance process. OPIC is mandated to "to mobilize and 
facilitate the participation of United States private capital and 
skills in the economic and social progress of less developed 
friendly countries and areas, thereby complementing the
development assistance objectives of the United States".3 It 
offers political risk insurance, loan assistance and other 
services to encourage American businesses to invest in less- 
developed countries (LDCs) and serve as a catylyst for local 
economic growth. John W. Sewell, President of the Overseas 
Development Council, a Washington DC think-tank, summarizes these 
benefits:
Private investment not only is of benefit to the 
firms but also contributes to the development process. 
...Investments by private firms have in many cases made 
a positive contribution to economic performance in the 
developing countries. They bring many factors which 
are scarce in the developing world— capital, 
technology, skills and manufacturing markets, and 
management— and by definition Investment provides 
additional income, employment, and tax revenues.4
As a development assistance scheme, the principles behind the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation are based upon mutual 
benefits to both American private enterprise and the needy 
countries that it invests in.
OPIC also serves as an example of government-business 
cooperation to achieve the goals of each. By promoting U.S. 
foreign investment abroad, the agency performs an important 
public policy function which strengthens the business community, 
makes America more competitive abroad, has a positive impact on 
the nation's economy, plus, serves foreign policy objectives.
The more business participation OPIC can attract to its programs, 
the more government and business benefit, and it assumes a 
greater development contribution to LDCs.
Many point out, however, a fundamental dichotomy between the 
profit motive behind private enterprise and the development needs 
of the Third World. A great deal of research has demonstrated 
that direct foreign investment, especially multinational 
corporations, contribute few benefits and even block the 
indigeneous development process in LDCs, which challenges the 
very premise upon which OPIC defines itself as a development 
agency. In addition, considering the many benefits accrued by 
American businesses taking advantage of OPIC programs and their 
foreign expansion, OPIC takes on the appearance and function of a 
subsidy and protection program. The question arises; Who do 
these programs benefit the most; for whom are the really 
intended? Corporate America or the needy masses of 
less-developed countries?
The object of this paper is to examine the two objectives, 
sometimes complementary, other times divergent, of the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation: the promotion of development in
needy regions and the encouragement and protection of U.S foreign 
investment. I seek to ascertain the ways in which the 
development objectives of OPIC limit the actions of U.S. 
investors participating in its programs or restrict others from 
utilizing OPIC services at all and, conversely, determine how 
OPIC programs and incentives to American business undermine or 
jeopardize potential developmental contributions to LDCs. Does a 
tension exist between these two factors, or does one goal merely 
take precedence in the agency's routine operations, decision-* 
making, and the execution of OPIC programs?
The effectiveness with which OPIC fulfills these objectives 
is difficult to assess. Ideally, such an undertaking would 
analyze the results of the agency's programs. This would well 
require an in-depth examination of OPIC case studies to determine 
the short- and long-term development benefits and negative 
impacts for the host countries. These studies should also assess 
the experiences of various participating business sectors to 
learn the positive effect of the agency's incentives and whether 
the same overseas investments would have occured regardless of 
OPIC's assistance. Such an approach would not only determine how 
well this agency carries out its mandate, but would also reveal 
the extent to which its development and investment encouragement 
objectives overlap and/or conflict with each other. However,
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such a task is far beyond the scope of this paper, not only due 
to the extensiveness of such research, but because of limited 
access to relevant information held confidential by business 
firms.
Instead of analyzing outcomes, this paper focuses upon 
OPXC's operations to assess the agency's efforts to fulfill its 
goals. The approach taken in the administration of its programs 
should reveal OPIC's biases and priorities. It may be assumed at 
the outset that the agency's development and investment promotion 
objectives are not wholly compatible and that compromises of each 
are made. Different political interests are served by OPIC 
programs and affect its activities. An examination of these 
influences, the structure of the agency, the administration of 
its programs, its thoroughness in addressing development, the 
special provisions extended to businesses, etc. will reveal the 
agency's approach in pursuing a design focused upon specific 
goals and policies. I hope to glean an understanding of the 
various factors and political pressures that have played and 
continue to play a role in OPIC's operations, weigh their 
influence and attempt to discern the priorities of OPIC.
Otic History And Operations
As a development agency OPIC must function within the 
confines of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961# yet OPIC operates 
differently and employs a different 'formula1 from most 
assistance strategies. In its dual objective of promoting both 
Third World development and U.S. investments overseas# this 
agency enjoys a rather unique position in the government. OPIC 
is completely separate from U.S. AID and is# instead# contained 
within the framwork of the State Department. While there is some 
cooperation with U.S. AID# and its administrator sits as chairman 
of OPIC's Board of Directors# OPIC also coordinates its services 
with many other federal bureaus such as the Export-Import Bank# 
Commerce Department# and the U.S. Trade and Development Program. 
Even its structure distinguishes OPIC from other government 
agencies. It is small and compact with a staff of about 150 
people# is self-sufficient with a corporate budget and income# is 
structured like a corporation and has the right to sue and be 
sued.5
The idea of a federal political risk insurance program 
originated following WWII under the Marshall Plan to promote U.S. 
investment in Europe's reconstruction. This service was extended 
to developing Third World countries in the 1950s. In 1961# the 
Agency for International Development (U.S. AID)# the government's 
principle foreign assistance agency# took over administration of
8this program until 1969 when Congress decided to transfer the 
program to a separate, independent agency: the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation. OPIC did not begin functioning, though, 
until January of 1971, when President Nixon issued an Executive 
Order which formally transferred operations.6 It received 
start-up appropriations from Congress and assumed the outstanding 
obligations from the U.S. AID program. While OPIC's predecessor 
pioneered the idea of political risk insurance, similar programs 
have since been established by other governments, multilateral 
organizations and even commercial insurance firms.
OPIC's primary service is providing political risk insurance 
to the American private sector to help alleviate the 
uncertainties of investing in LDCs. Its programs are currently 
available in over 100 countries defined as "less developed 
friendly countries and areas" with which OPIC has established 
bilateral agreements for its operations. It offers insurance 
against three major types of political risks: incovertibility,
expropriation, and political violence. Inconvertability coverage 
protects against the inability to convert profits and capital in 
the local currency into U.S. dollars. Expropriation insurance 
protects against the confiscation or nationalization of capital 
without fair compensation. Political violence insurance covers 
losses due to war, revolution, insurrection, and civil strife.
OPIC also works with private insurance companies to coordinate 
complementary coverage for an investor. While expropriations, 
revolutions and wars do not occur every day, giant losses can hit
companies caught in their midst. Two major events have forced 
OPIC to make numerous settlements: the Chilean expropriation of
copper mines and other American investments in 1971 ($315 million 
on 23 claims), and the 1979 revolution in Iran ($14.5 million on 
10 claims) . }
The finance program of OPIC was added in the late 1970s. It 
provides direct loans to small and medium-sized American firms 
(as defined each year by Fortune Magazine) ranging from $250,000 
to $6 million. Interest rates on Vues# loans are determined by 
the nature of the project, but generally parallel commercial 
rates. OPIC also issues loan guarantees, under which funding can 
be obtained from commercial lending institutions. Typical 
guarantees range from $1 to $25 million, but can be as large as 
$50 million and are available to businesses regardless of size.
Of course, as a government agency, OPIC faces certain 
constraints that are not a problem among similar services offered 
in the private sector; for example, authorization to only assist 
projects in "friendly" LDCs or rules limiting OPIC's insurance 
coverage in a single country to 10 percent of the agency's total 
exposure (for portfolio diversity). OPIC's operations are 
periodically (usually every 3-4 years) reviewed by Congress and 
reauthorized. At such times, new requirements can be added to 
the agency's legislation and it has, at times, faced cancellation 
altogether. However, OPIC also enjoys certain advantages by 
virtue of its federal status. All its services are backed by the 
full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury. An interview with
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Eric P. Luhmann, Manager of Pre-investment Services, confirmed 
that OPIC is sometimes privy to information not available to 
commercial institutions. He admitted that "we do have access to 
State Department information that comes in and we are kept very 
much in tune with the current situation in a country."8 This 
information, however, is not used to compete with services in the 
private sector; Mr. Luhmann emphasized OPIC's cooperation with 
commercial insurance and banking Institutions to supply 
complementary services for investors.
OPIC has expanded its basic programs over the years to 
include various pre-investment services to assist American 
business in planning an overseas project. The "Opportunity Bank" 
is a computerized data system that can match the interests of 
U.S. companies with the needs and requirements of projects in the 
developing world. "Investment missions" are organized trips five 
times a year for American businessmen to observe the environment 
and learn about potential investment in selected developing 
countries. The Investor Information Service (IIS) is a 
publications clearinghouse for American business tj purchase 
information kits detailing various factors of the investment 
climate in individual countries or regions, including trade laws, 
political conditions, business taxes and regulations, etc.
A great deal of concern and debate surrounded OPIC when 
Congress considered its formation in 1969. Some legislators were 
critical of removing an important foreign aid tool form U.S. AID 
and turning it over to an organization governed by business
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interests. Others felt that greater government ties with U.S. 
corporations might stir up charges of economic colonialism. On 
the other hand, one committee report favored a partnership 
between policy makers and the private sector that could operate 
in a business-like manner. The corporate structure and business 
methods of OPIC were considered main assets that would result in 
better monitoring of project performance and prudent risk- 
management principles.9 A study conducted by the President's 
General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance program also 
recommended the formation of such a government investment 
corporation since such programs are "predominantly of a business 
nature, are revenue producing and call for a considerable 
flexibility of administering and funding."10
Events soon after OPIC began functioning in 1971 jeopardized 
its existence and affected its operations for many years after.
By taking over the insurance program that had been conducted by 
U.S. AID, OPIC also inherited the outstanding liabilities which 
carried the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury. Shortly 
after OPIC assumed operations, the Chilean government began a 
process to nationalize the U.S.-owned copper mines and the Chile 
Telephone Company, 70 percent of which was owned by a U.S. 
affiliate. The compensation payments offered by the Allende 
government were considered insufficient and the expropriation 
claims which were subsequently filled against OPIC, over $300 
million, threatened the agency with insolvency. The agency 
sought an additional $85 million from Congress to reinforce its
12
insurance reserves which initiated several congressional hearings 
to review OPIC's operations and prompted an effort by some 
members to eliminate OPIC.11 To compensate for AID'S portfolio 
and in response to outide pressures, OPIC concentrated on 
low-risk investments, a conservative measure which undermined the 
developmental aspects of its mandate.12 OPIC remains cautious in 
its operations, for it took several years for the agency to 
build-up its financial stability.
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation now finds itself 
in excellent financial condition. OPIC is not only self- 
sustaining, but each year it shows a profit: the revenues
generated by insurance premiums and loan interest have gradually 
reinforced its reserves until they reached $1.3 billion in 1988.13 
That same year, the agency supported a record 167 projects in 54 
developing countries. The distribution of these went as follows:
Projects by Region, 1988
Latin America/Caribbean
Projects by Industry, 1988
Services 
41 (251)
Manufactories 
41 (251)
Banking t Finance 
30 (18%)
Construction 
5 (3%)
Tourism 
6 (4%)
Minerals 4 Energy 
10 (6%)
Agribusiness 
34 (201)
source: 1988 OPIC Development Report, p.9.
*nott: percentages may not add properly due to rounding.
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The agency currently operates in about 100 developing nations.
In October, 1988, the new OPIC Amendments Act was authorized by 
Congress, extending operations for the next four years.
Eligibility for American business seeking to participate in 
OPIC programs is based upon factors such as: financial stability 
of a proposed project, U.S.-based ownership, no adverse effect on 
the U.S. economy, plus projects require the approval of the host 
country government. Proposed development contributions are 
determined by OPIC applications, detailed here by Harvey Himberg, 
Director of Development Policy and Environmental Affairs:
Our application includes a lot of questions on host 
government economic impact, including employment in 
the construction phase and in the operations phase of 
the project, foreign exchange, cost and benefit for 
the host country, and the revenue that the host 
country’s government will obtain [e.g. taxes, tariffs] 
and that which it may forego [e.g. to provide support 
services and structures] as a result of the project.
We also take into account qualitative impact such as 
training, education, technology transfer, construction 
of infrastructure in connection with the project, 
health facilities that may be available to the 
employees and to the wider community, and educational 
facilities that may be provided. Basically the whole 
range of social and economic impacts that can be 
anticipated. Plus, we conduct a thorough 
environmental assessment of each project to determine 
its likely impact on the environment, public and 
worker health and safety in the country. We have a 
separate Congressional requirement to do that in 
addition to the development impact analysis.14
The range of ventures supported by OPIC programs is 
extensive. For example, political insurance for the expansion of 
a DelMonte Corporation facility for producing pineapple juice 
concentrate on the unstable Philippine island of Mindanao.15 Many 
of America's financial institutions including American Express
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Bank, Ltd. and Citibank, N.A. rely upon OPIC insurance when 
establishing banking branches in the Third World. OPIC provided 
a direct loan for $200,000 to U.S. investors who purchased and 
upgraded a wood products company in Belize which will employ 29
local workers.16 A $6.5 million loan guarantee went for the 
expansion of Egypt’s largest private-sector facility for storing 
and bagging animal feed which it imports from the United States.1' 
The majority of OPIC-assisted projects are joint-ventures 
(partnership with a foreign affiliate), but can also be 
wholly-owned subsidiaries or even investments in industries 
undergoing privitization by a foreign government.18
OPIC * s programs perform a "multiplier" effect; using 
limited public resources to mobilize a far greater volume of 
private resource flows to LDCs. According to the agency's 
estimates, the record number of 167 projects assisted in 198£ 
will inject approximitely $1.6 billion in initial capital 
expenditures.19 Lack of access to capital is a mammoth obstacle 
to Third World development. The flow of official aid funds is 
declining as industrial countries face budgetary problems, and 
the Third World debt crises has made commercial banks reluctant 
to lend additional money to LDCs. Many needy countries are also 
experiencing "capital flight", when the indigenous wealthy invest 
in foreign accounts instead of local banks, which reduces the 
overall supply of domestic resources. This tightening supply of 
capital has led the governments of many developing countries to 
liberalize their economic policy and provide investment
15
incentives such as tax holidays, duty-free imports of materials 
and equipment, fewer restrictions on repatriation of profits, 
etc. in order to attract foreign investment.
In addition to capital, OPIC also emphasizes the 
contributions of employment, technology transfer and foreign 
exchange earnings in the projects that it assists. OPIC expects 
its 1988 projects to generate more than 20,000 host-country jobs, 
$63 million in net foreign exchange savings per year, and $137 
million in net annual government revenues collected from import
duties and taxes.20 Foreign private enterprise introduces new 
knowledge, industrial technology and production techniques 
unavailable in many LDCs which allows more efficient use of 
resources, both human and material, and diffuses into other 
sectors of the community. A researcher at the Harvard Business 
School emphasizes this contribution: "there is a strong case to
be made that detailed industrial Information and ways of 
producing things are more readily transmitted by way of 
multinational enterprises than by any of the other channels of 
communication [e.g. universities, government sources, etc.].”21 
The training programs and management experience introduced by 
foreign business gives local workers new skills and knowledge.
The presence of foreign business affiliates promotes greater 
integration of the LDC economies with the international economic 
system. Manufacturing facilities that produce for the local 
market help LDCs to reduce their reliance on imports and become 
more self-sufficient, while export-based production brings in
needed foreign currency. The foreign affiliate's connections to 
the American parent company can lead to increased commercial ties
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with the U.S. and engender the international marketing skills 
necessary to consider other overseas markets. OPIC also claims 
less tangible development benefits from American investments 
overseas: the transfer of the free enterprise tradition serves
as a catalyst for the establishment of indigenous businesses, and 
the presence of American organizations fosters ideals of 
democracy and pluralism among host societies.
Definition of Development and 
Critical Arguments
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It seems appropriate at this point to address the meaning of 
development, though it is a term that defies precise definition. 
Development is a dynamic process of social and economic change 
that improves the standard of living or the living conditions of
the entire population of a country or region.22 It is 
distinguished from increased production or economic growth for 
"it is possible to have more growth while, at the same time, the 
poor majority become poorer and more desperate for survival"23 
This condition dictates the need for development to be 
"broad-based" to reach all levels of a society, for unbalanced 
growth can be economically unstable and politically volitile.
And to ensure that development in an underdeveloped country is 
long-term, this process must be culturally-accommodating and 
self-sustaining, grounded in the resources (both human and 
material) of a region and its cultural values.
Development cannot be imposed or imported, but this progress 
can be stimulated and promoted by external influences. However, 
such a broad range of objectives presents a formidable task in 
establishing a foreign assistance policy to a developed country. 
This dilemma surfaced during a recent review of the U.S. foreign 
assistance program conducted by a House Task Force. The study 
found 33 objectives scattered through the Foreign Assistance Act
and noted that an AID document lists 7'5 priorities for economic 
assistance.24 After concluding that "there are too many 
objectives" and identifying many other shortcomings, the Task 
Force recommendation focused upon four main foreign policy 
objectives: (1) Broad-based economic growth, (2) Environmental
sustainability, (3) Poverty alleviation and (4) The promotion of 
political, social, and economic pluralism.25 While these findings 
have not been implemented, they demonstrate the recognition of 
development as a complex, progressive and sweeping process.
Many critics deny, however, that foreign private investment 
can contribute to the development process of less-developed 
countries. A large body of literature and research has emerged 
condemning the presence of multinational corporations in LDCs. 
These critics take issue with virtually every benefit claimed by 
proponents of foreign direct investment, like OPIC. They contend 
that the capital initially invested by foreign affiliates is 
quickly counteracted by deteriorating terms of trade with 
industrial countries and when generated earnings are sent back to 
the country of the parent company. By repatriating more profits 
than they provide in new investments, companies can cause a net 
out-flow of capital from LDCs and act as a drain on the host 
country's balance-of-payments. The local government is often 
required to supply "counter-part" contributions for incoming 
industry such as improving infrastructure, energy sources and
roads, which can tie up a government's scarce resources.26 Many 
critics point to the lack of substantial progress and, indeed,
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worsening international situation of many LDCs as evidence of the 
long-term negative economic impact of multinational firms in 
these countries.
Critics also disagree that foreign corporations introduce 
imports t technologies. They claim that only small amounts of 
technology are actually transferred and it is typically out-dated 
or inappropriate to the local conditions, particularly, 
capital-intensive techniques in countries where the greatest need 
is to create additional jobs. Local production in LDCs is 
displaced when the competitive advantage of multinational 
businesses, namely economies of scale, technology, access to 
markets, financing, etc., allows them to drive indigenous firms 
out of business. Local entrepreneurs are stifled which is 
detrimental to the possibility of self-sustained national 
development. Local elites often benefit from incoming businesses 
which widens the economic gaps between classes and deepens 
cleavages in the social structure. Foreign firms distort 
cultural values and social behavior, for example, when they 
introduce inappropriate products, especially food items (like 
soft drinks, infant formula), that can alter local patterns of 
consumption and increase the reliance on imported values and 
tastes.27 This process leads to greater dependence of LDCs upon 
industrial countries and their foreign affiliates. Critics point 
out that there are numerous alternatives to international 
investment for needed capital, technology, skills, etc., that are 
not is detrimental to the social and economic systems of the
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Third World.
Multinational businesses are often regarded as an important 
mechanism in the control of LDCs by industrial countries. The 
size and economic power of some corporations dwarfs the economies 
of poorer countries where they can wield considerable influence 
in national affairs. The governments of industrial nations are 
accused of pressuring economic policy reforms in LDCs to open up 
their economies for foreign investment and offer incentives such 
as tax holidays, tarriff deferrals and even "free enterprise 
zones'*. The concentration of many large, foreign firms 
perpetuates the dependency of Third World nations on the 
industrial economies which dictate commodity prices and 
production. Fears of the growing percentage of foreign ownership 
and domination have, at different times, stirred waves of 
economic nationalism in many Third World nations. This concern 
has even risen in the U.S. over the growing number of Japanese, 
British or other nationals' companies investing on American 
soil. It is important to point out, however, the discrepency 
between the small percentage of foreign-owned investments in the 
U.S. compared to many Third World nations where it is not 
uncommon that between a quarter and a half of their modern 
industry is foreign-owned or controlled. This can constitute a 
frightening erosion of control over the domestic economy by LDC
governments.28
Such condemning arguments undermine the very premise upon 
which OPIC considers itself a development aqency, namely, that
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foreign private investment contributes to the development process 
of less-developed countries. However, the treatment of 
multinational business as a monolithic entity by such critics is 
an oversimplification of a very complex issue. While there are 
cases of social disruption and exploitation due to the abuses of 
capitalism, there remains, nontheless, a potential to contribute 
important resources and skills by the introduction of foreign 
business into needy regions. I do not wish to evaluate the 
contending perspectives on the role of foreign private investment 
in LDCs. Investment in these circumstances is very controversial 
and, to a large extent, the various perspectives in support of 
this role and those criticizing it are grounded in divergent 
economic theories, each with relevant merit. However, the 
critical arguement presented above lends suspicion to some of the 
lofty development claims professed by OPIC.
While some criticism of foreign private business is open to 
debate, the nature of such ventures and their intervention in 
LDCs undeniably distorts the indigineous development of these 
independent countries. Grant L. Reuber, Professor of Economics 
an the University of Western Ontario, Canada, raises an important 
point: "Why is the discussion so abruptly altered when one turns
from the role of investment in economic development to the role 
of private foreign investment? The key element in explaining 
this change is that private foreign investment is not only owned 
and controlled by private groups in pursuit of private profits 
but also by private interests who are non-residents to boot."29
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Alien personnel and practices can disrupt social values and alter 
habits, and the disregard for cultural considerations can 
unfavorably affect the local community. On a political level, 
the managers and owners of foreign affiliates are not as firmly 
subject to the jurisdiction of local governments as are 
indigenous businesses. Foreign private investment locates in LDCs 
according to well-reasoned business plans and projections, not 
for reasons of charity. Decision-making based upon profit 
motives is not necessarily compatible with the development needs 
of Third World countries.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the specific 
investment projects assisted by OPIC according to such concerns. 
OPIC's approach to development does not attempt to address 
immediate human needs such as food and health care nor to effect 
sweeping change. OPIC's focus is on investment as a vehicle to 
deliver needed resources to a specific sector which is expected 
to have a positive impact on the community. The agency's 
screening and regulation of projects is designed to curtail 
harmful impacts of the investments that it sponsors and these 
provisions are intended to focus the development contributions to 
the host country. In the task of assessing of the dual 
objectives of development assistance and foreign investment 
encouragement of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 
this paper maintains a flexible stance: there must be some
development benefits accrued by the communities of Third World 
nations hosting OPIC-sponsored business investments, as well as
unfavorable side-effects. The balance between these two factors 
and whether the benefits out-weigh the costs, varies from project 
to project.
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OPIC's Investment Promotion Role
Encouraging international business development in trade and 
investment has become increasingly important in American public 
policy. Robert Gilpin of Princeton University explains the 
expansion of U.S. business overseas as a result of public policy 
emphasis, as well as the advances of communications and 
transportation technologies and the dynamics of economic 
competition.30 He contends that businesses trade and invest 
overseas, in part, because federal policies consider it to be in 
the larger national interest and strongly encourage it. Since WW 
II, the federal government has promoted U.S. foreign investment 
through various incentives, tax allowances and support programs. 
American business has been an important symbol of U.S. presence 
overseas and its success served as an example to foster an 
international climate based on liberal economic principles. It 
also strengthened the domestic U.S. economy as multinational 
corporations gained the benefits of allocating production across 
national boundaries. They were able to minimize trade barriers 
and tariffs, secure access to raw materials, take advantage of 
low labor costs, penetrate new markets and protect old ones. By 
broadening their economic base, multinational corporations 
aggressively sought to suppress foreign competition.
The governments of other industrial nations likewise 
encourage their industries to expand overseas, some with
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incentives and subsidies far more aggressive than the U.S. and 
challenging U.S. businesses with ever stiffer competition. OPIC 
officials are quick to point out that, without agencies like the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation and other federal 
incentives, American investors would be sorely disadvantaged 
against their foreign competitors. One journalist noted that 
OPIC's inception in 1969 propitiously occured "at a time when 
American companies were busily taking advantage of an overvalued 
dollar to buy up assets overseas."31 However, with many foreign 
companies buying assets in the United States today, the 
government is more aggressively promoting the expansion of 
American business abroad.
The U.S. government, in fact, offers more than 120 different 
programs to provide support for exporters and investors seeking 
to compete internationally. The majority of these are 
administered by eight federal agencies: Department of
Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Agency for International Development (U.S. AID), 
Export-Import Bank of the United States, Small Business 
Administration, and the U.S. Trade and Development Program.
Along with these, OPIC is considered an important mechanism to 
promote overseas investment. It coordinates some of its services 
with these other agencies, however OPIC's insurance program is 
unique in the federal government. Fred Stokeld, Director of 
International Business Relations for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
which represents over 185,000 corporations, commends the agency:
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"OPIC provides an outstanding example of effective 
business-government partnerships. In its sixteen years of 
operation, OPIC has established an impressive record as an agency
that uses its experience to seek new ways to support business. " 3?
OPIC's support goes beyond merely offering its services; 
the agency actively seeks out investment opportunities in LDCs to 
offer U.S. investors and promotes its services among the American 
business community. This activity also fits in with OPIC’s 
status as a self-sufficient government corporation. It is 
expected to function on commercial lines and maintain secure 
financial reserves, which implies making sound financial 
decisions in profitable ventures. Yet, as a government body, 
profit maximization is not top priority and so OPIC provides many 
additional services and reserves flexibility in its commitments 
to support projects that might be rejected on a purely commercial 
basis. Services extend along the process of a business venture; 
from initial background information to assisting with 
reconnaissance trips, feasibility studies, financing the deal, 
insurance, and even expanding operations later on.
Recognizing that overseas investment is more difficult for 
smaller companies, Congress required OPIC in 1974 to show 
preference to projects involving smaller investors. Such firms 
often lack the staff, resources and experience to meet the 
challenges of foreign expansion. Ok „ administration is 
flexible to make accomodations for small business needs. Several 
specialized programs designed for small investors have been
27
introduced, such as grants for feasibility studies, 
reconnaissance trips, a small contractors* guaranty program, 
plus, OPIC direct loans are reserved for small firms (loan 
guarantees are available to any sized firm). In 1988, smaxl 
businesses were defined as industrial companies with annual sales 
of Jess than $130 million and non-industrial companies with 
stockholders* equity of less than $47 million.33 These terms are 
adjusted annually to reflect changes in the U.S. economy. Such 
efforts by OPIC to attract small investors also counter 
criticisms that the agency caters to the interests of large 
multinational corporations.
In addition to the official assistance provided by its 
programs, OPIC*s participation lends a certain degree of 
reassurance and guarantee, especially to small ventures, in its 
advice and experience as an expert investor.34 OPIC*s ties to the 
State Department may suggest an extra measure of security with 
the oversight of the foreign policy extablishment in the host 
country. Donald R. McGraw, chief financial officer of the 
international engineering and construction firm, The M.W. Kellogg 
Company, credits 0PIC*s creative financing schemes as Ma catalyst 
for our success in obtaining international financing, because it 
provides a visible sign that the U.S. government places both 
faith and credit in the project. Once OPIC agrees to its 
participation, other sources of financing from U.S. and 
international institutions and agencies fall more easily into
ii 35place.
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During the Reagan Administration, OPIC took on a 
particularly active role in promoting overseas investment. The 
administration affected a major shift within U.S. development 
policy to concentrate on the private sector and OPIC was 
spotlighted as the administration hoped private business would 
help fill in the gap between the shrinking pool of government aid
money and the needs of developing countries.36 Craig A. Nalen, a 
successful business executive, was appointed President <-f OPIC in 
1981 and he quickly embarked upon a vigerous campaign to broaden 
the awareness of OPIC services among the American business 
community. The efforts appear to have paid off. A national ad 
campaign launched in 1982 generated a four-fold increase in 
inquires,37 and during the 1981-84 period, OPIC issued a total of 
$12.8 billion worth of coverage reflecting a new high compared 
with a total of $8.6 billion for the agency's first ten years of 
operations.38 Increased revenues from insurance premiums and loan 
interest greatly improved OPIC's financial reserves. The agency 
proceeded to make two installments, in 1982 and 1984, to the U.S. 
Treasury to repay the original $106 million start-up 
appropriations.39 This move solidified OPIC status as a self- 
sufficient operation, relying upon its own funds and not on tax 
payers' money. The agency continues to have the authority to 
borrow funds from the U.S. Treasury, which ultimately backs all 
of OPIC's obligations.
OPIC's marketing attempt to reach the American business 
community included many innovative approaches (especially
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considering it is a federal agency). As a variation of its 
investment missions where American investors travel to a selected 
country, OPIC sponsored two-hour "Telemissions”, international 
teleconferences linking government and business leaders of a 
selected developing country with hundreds of U.S. businessmen 
gathered to learn of investment opportunities. OPIC uses direct 
mailings, industry seminars, workshops and extensive advertising 
in newspapers, business and trade journals, often as cooperative 
efforts with private-sector organizations. OPIC's president, 
Craig Nalen, personally traveled around the world to address 
foreign officials and potential investors and has drawn on 
extensive corporate ties to spread the word of OPIC's 
opportunities.40 Many of these activities have been cut back in 
recent years, though, as OPIC's allocations for "investment 
encouragement” have been reduced by the Office of Management and 
Budget which is wary of extensive marketing by a federal agency.41
In 1983, OPIC developed and coordinated "Operation 
Opportunity", a cooperative effort between eight federal 
agencies, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and ten other private- 
sector organizations to introduce the American business community 
to ti.e many federal programs supporting overseas investment and 
trade. The massive effort focused on gathering information about 
these typically scattered programs into a step-by-step format 
with corresponding addresses, case studies and advice. This 
information was presented in a 270-page guidebook, Washington1s 
Imat Kept Saarets;_&,!L,S GoyegMient, Guide to International
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Business, edited by OPIC^ Vice-President of Operations. The 
project culminated with "Operation Opportunity", a live video- 
conference attended by more than 5,000 business executives in 44 
cities and televised to over 40 colleges and universities 
nation-wide.
OPIC maintains close ties with the American business 
community which strongly supports OPIC and its programs. During 
public hearings conducted since 1986 to allow an open forum for 
comments and criticism of the agency, many business associations 
have appeared to express their strong support of OPIC. A 
spokesman for the National Association of Manufactors which 
represents 13,000 corporations noted "U.S. investment abroad is 
essential to the encouragement of U.S. exports and the 
maintenance of our industrial base"42 and "To the degree that OPIC 
assists in this process— and we believe that it does pay close 
attention to its export promotion mandate— we believe that OPIC 
is an important export promotion tool."43 Also testifying was 
Lawrence Hayes, Vice President of the American Association of 
Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACCLA), comprised of 22 
American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America which represents 
14,000 U.S. and local firms in that region. He commended OPIC's 
years of negotiations to reopen its programs in the countries of 
the Andean Pact, a 1971 regional agreement among six South 
American countries to promote economic nationalism which had
restricted foreign investment.44 Fred Stokeld, Director of 
International Business Relations for the U.S. Chamber of
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Commerce, expressed support on behalf of the chamber and pledged: 
"We recognize that OPIC operates under a great many restrictions 
and reporting requirements, reflecting the numerous policy 
ramifications of the Congressional mandate. We shall continue to 
urge Congress to review mandatory requirements carefully and
entrust broader discretion to the agency."45 The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce represents over 185,000 corporations and organizations 
including many involved in international business, a constituency 
that makes for a powerful lobbying voice in Congress.
OPIC works closely with some of these organizations when 
coordinating its business seminars, Investment mission tours, 
etc. One such group is the Caribbean/Central America Action 
(CCAA), a lobbying and public relations firm chaired by David 
Rockefeller. Although primarily funded by corporations with 
business interests in the Caribbean and Latin America, the group 
has also received some funds from U.S. AID, and OPIC has provided 
financing for a series of booklets it put out advertising 
investment opportunities in the Caribbean region.46 Robert 
Jordan, a public affairs official at OPIC, noted that the agency 
"works fairly closely, on a day-to-day basis" with CCAA.47 In 
addition to promoting U.S. investment abroad, the Caribbean/ 
Central America Action group searches out companies in the region 
with business potential for U.S. companies, sponsors business 
conferences, and organizes lobbying efforts in Latin America to 
influence local governments. Along with OPIC and the White 
House's Office of Private Sector Initiaves, CCAA co-sponsored an
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OPIC investment mission to Grenada for interested U.S. 
businessmen just months after the 1983 invasion.48
OPIC officials are eager to point out how their programs 
positively impact the domestic economy. Addressing recent alarms 
of the U.S. trade deficit and America's declining competitiveness 
in international markets, they argue for the aggressive expansion 
of U.S. investment overseas as the surest solution.49 Research 
suggests that exports follow foreign investment. A 1985 Commerce 
Department study showed that one-third of total U.S. exports go 
to foreign subsidiaries as equipment, raw materials and 
manufactoring supplies. While the Third World debt crisis and 
rising dollar exchange rates have contributed to a 13 percent 
drop in U.S. exports to less-developed countries in the period 
1982 to 1985, the export level remained steady to the American 
affiliates in those countries.50 Many jobs are dependant on the 
export flows to foreign affiliates, so this positive affect on 
the trade balance also translates into American jobs. OPIC 
estimates that for every billion dollars of exports, 25,000 to 
30,000 new U.S. jobs are created.
The overseas expansion of American business is considered 
critical in view of increasing foreign competition if America is 
to retain its share of world markets. Peter F. Drucker, a 
professor and prominent spokesman on business issues, calls 
attention to the shift in the world economy from trade, which is 
steadly declining, to international investment, which is 
"booming". He stresses the importance of penetrating foreign
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markets and maintaining a physical presence for first-hand 
knowledge of consumer attitudes.51 And since the developing 
countries represent the fastest growing markets and account for 
two-thirds of the world's population# OPIC officials extol the 
pertinence of the agency's opportunities. While addressing a 
gathering of businessmen at an OPIC outreach seminar in Boston in 
1988# OPIC president Craig Nalen queried his audience# "What 
better way to seize a share of an overseas market than to set up 
a plant and export all the parts# machinery and materials that it 
needs to serve a lucrative local market?1'52
It is difficult to ultimately assess the effectiveness of 
OPICs efforts to stimulate overseas investment— to distinguish 
those business ventures in which OPIC assistance was a 
significant contributing factor in the decision to proceed 
overseas against others which would have occured even without 
OPIC support. Over the years# OPIC has become increasingly 
aggressive in its efforts to attract American business to 
locations abroad. In addition to offering new programs to better 
meet the needs of investors# the agency has engaged in various 
marketing and advertising campaigns. It has allied itself with 
the business community in an active public-private partnership 
and utilized various networks of business associations to spread 
the word of its services. OPIC has even taken unusual initiative 
in its "Operation Opportunity" to untangle the mass of federal 
incentive programs for overseas investment arid trade and 
coordinated them into a more accessible forum. Yet despite these
endeavors, OPIC officials admit they face an uphill struggle and 
bemoan the fact that these federal incentive programs are sadly 
underutilized. They attribute this inactivity by American 
businesses to a kind of "isolationism" attitude, a reluctance to
risk venturing into unfamiliar territories,53 plus, the wariness 
of the private sector to federal programs and government 
bureaucracy.54 OPIC has exerted much effort to overcome this 
distrust and hesitancy and to impress the usefulness of Its 
programs, for it is precisely some of these foreign risks and 
insecurities that OPICs political risk insurance addresses.
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OPIC Serves as an Effective 
Foreign Policy Tool
AS an ifehcy ghder the jurisdiclion of the U.S. State 
0ifi#FtWj|hfcr O p l C activities conform with and reinforce the 
objectives of U.S, foreign policy. U.S foreign investment has 
long been considered ah important element in the government's 
broad international goals and since WW II, federal programs have 
encouraged and protected American overseas investment. Robert 
Gilpin of Princeton University considers the expansion of 
multinational corporations and the establishment of America's 
international political and military superiority as mutually 
interdependent events. bb The presence of American corporations 
overseas is an important factor reinforcing American predominance 
in foreign relations and Gilpin contends that the White House and 
the State Department have sought to channel this investment so as 
to enhance foreign policy objectives. As an example of a 
government mechanism to promote this activity, the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation is ar integral part of the foreign 
policy establishment.
OPIC's close ties with the State Department benefit the 
agency with information on the internal situations of countries, 
but have also made OPIC an effective instrument to pursue 
specific policy goals. When Corazon Aquino became President of 
the Philippines, OPIC organized new programs to attract investors
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to that country *a an aatenaion of tha State Department's backing 
of the hew regime, including an investment mission and a 
tfashingtcin D.C. seminar attended by over 500 business executives
for a program by Mrs* Aquino and her government ministers. b! OPIC 
also bresents itself as an alternate ©hihhil to influence foreign 
governments, especially when authorised U.S. aid is absent or is 
cut back? commercial links and political Influence are 
maintained,18 In response to Poland's racent official recognition 
of the iolidatity Trade Union, a process is under way to extend
OPIC program* t© this country»ftl this would be a vital element in 
President Bush's recent pledge for economic assistance to Poland, 
as well as a prelude to increased economic relations with Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union. Hungary is also being considered 
for OPIC programs.60 The establishment of American companies 
would serve as an important symbol of U.S. presence in these 
countries.
OPIC programs car. serve as a "carrot" incentive or reward to 
influence other governments. Shortly after taking office, 
President Reagan told people to "watch Jamaica" which had just 
elected to replace the democratic-socialist leadership with a 
capitalist-oriented Prime Minister, Edward Seaga. Reagan 
targeted the Caribbean island as a showcase to demonstrate the 
superiority of capitalism to socialism. Although it had scarcely 
seen any assistance from Washington earlier, Jamaica enjoyed a 
sudden flow of U.S. foreign aid, leaping from 12.7 million in 
1980 to 158.4 million the following year.61 At the prompting of
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President Reagan, OPIC violated a long-standing regulation that 
limits the agency's insurance in any single country to 10 percent 
of the agency's total coverage. OPIC exceeded that limit when it 
authorized a $50 million loan guarantee for Alumina Partners of 
Jamaica, a joint venture of Anaconda, Kaiser Aluminum, and
Reynolds Metals, to open a new bauxite mine.62 In addition, these 
three corporations were members of the U.S. Business Committee on 
Jamaica, a group of 24 corporations organized by David 
Rockefeller to promote the Seaga administration. The N e w  York 
Times reported that this group lobbied the Reagan administration 
to aid the aluminum industry by buying Jamican bauxite, even 
though worldwide demand for aluminum and bauxite was depressed.
OPIC found itsolf in the midst of the Nicarguan Contra 
controversy when national press attention revealei that the State 
Department had recommended an OPIC loan to an individual 
assisting the Cortra forces who later defaulted on the loan. Mr. 
John Hull who received the loan, was involved in the Contra 
supply network of Oliver North and owned extensive properties in 
Costa Rica chat were used a > Contra landing strips and military 
staging areas. The stated intention of the loan was to start a 
new company in Cost. Rica tor the manufacture of ax and 
wheelbarrow handles from local timber. Although the loan was 
granted in 1984, it was not until 1986 that an OPIC memorandum 
acknowledged that "John Hull has done nothing to get the business
started or pay off the OPIC loan."64 Senate hearings into the 
matter later revealed this default, but also that OPIC officials
had been lax In processing the loan, failing to take necessary 
steps to confirm the financial backing for it. They attributed 
the approval to the strong recommendation of the U.S. Embassy in 
Costa Rica who saw it as a means to strengthen American ties with 
Costa Rica. However, the American ambassador there, Curtin 
Winsor, Jr., denied any role in the loan's approval because he 
had newly arrived at his post at the time of the loan request. 
OPIC officials referred the case to the Department of Justice for 
criminal prosecution for fraud.65 These events bring into 
question the assessment procedures used by OPIC, its monitoring 
capabilities as well as the lack of leverage to assure proper use 
of the agency's services. It also smacks of OPIC's use as a 
vehicle for iess-than-proper foreign policy objectives by the 
Administration.
Foreign policy influence can flow in the opposite direction, 
too, as the U.S. exerts influence on behalf of OPIC and the 
interests of American business overseas. For example, when it 
pressures the governments of LDCs for economic policy reforms to 
create a more open climate for foreign investment. And American 
investors can count on support from the U.S. embassy should 
problems arise in dealing with local government officials. While 
mediation may be sufficient at times, Washington can be provoked 
into strong action. Since all OPIC holdings are backed by the 
U.S. Treasury, "this liability of the Treasury Department, which 
may easily be for several hundred million dollars in a single 
country, can affect U.S. foreign policy toward a particular
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foreign government.1,66 David Wall of the University of Sussex, 
England, condemns this vulnerability of a host country and 
infringement on its national soverignty:
Any investment which takes place in developing 
countries as a result of the companies knowing that 
their governments will 'insure' them against 
expropriations risks with threats of military, 
diplomatic, or economic action can be considered as 
unambiguously contrary to the interests of the 
country invested in. [Such official investment 
programs are typically regarded] as beneficial to the 
less-developed countries, and compensation paid out 
under such schemes can be regarded as aid. In 
practice, however,...they are likely to be simply 
grafted on a threat structure.67
He goes on the explain how, when the Chilean government
nationalized U.S. copper mines insured by OPIC without sufficient
compensation, Washington imposed strict economic sanctions on
Chile to coerce increased compensation to the U.S. investors.
Washington has also threatened to withold foreign aid from
Panama, Honduras and Costa Rica to pressure those governments to
settle disputes involving U.S. investors.68 Such fear of
retaliation greatly inhibts host countries from intervening on
the actions of foreign businesses.
Agency Regulations That Limit 
Investment Activity
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Of course, the development concerns of OPIC necessarily 
place restrictions on the agency's operations and limitations on 
the range of investment activity that business participants can 
engage in. OPIC operates within the confines of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 and every amendment that has been made to 
it. The agency's own statues include specific policy guidelines 
and regulations, and congressional reauthorizations often include 
amendments and new provisions. As described earlier, OPIC's 
eligibility requirements exclude some business ventures and 
others may be discouraged from even applying. In addition to 
investments harmful to the host country, OPIC will also deny 
assistance to investments that are likely to have a negative 
effect on U.S. employment or balance of payments. While over 100 
countries are eligible, some of OPIC's services are limited in 
higher income countries like Barbados, Israel, Kuwait, Oman and 
the Bahamas. OPIC periodically reviews per capita income 
figures to identify countries that have graduated to a higher 
income group and removes them from its programs. Greece, Malta,
Portugal and South Korea were so eliminated in 1988.69
Concerned about the impact that OPIC-sponsored investments 
could have on the host countries, Congress included three new 
provisions in the agency's 1985 reauthorization to cover the
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environment, natural resources and public health and safety.
OPIC is now "(1) prohibited from assisting any project posing an 
unreasonable or major environmental or safety hazard; (2) 
required to notify host governments of environmentally sensitive 
projects that it proposes to assist; and (3) directed to ensure 
that all of its projects are consistent with the provisions of 
the Foreign Assistance Act pertaining to tropical deforestation 
and biological diversity."70 The agency found that investors 
whose projects posed environmental or safety hazards were 
generally willing to make changes to conform with these criteria. 
Although no projects were formally rejected on environmental 
grounds during 1988, officials expect that several projects were 
likely discouraged from even applying.71
The 1985 OPIC Amendments Act also included a new provision 
that prohibits the awarding of OPIC benefits to projects in 
countries not taking steps to adopt and implement law3 that 
extend internationally recognized worker rights, including the 
right of association and the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, minimum wage and child labor laws. An inter-agency 
committee determines which less-developed countries are eligible 
for trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) which are based on worker rights and other provisions.
OPIC has bound itself to suspend operations in countries no 
longer included in the GSP program because of worker rights 
criteria.72 Many human rights watch organizations and 
internationally concerned labor unions appear before OPIC public
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hearings to testify on country violations and to urge closer 
monitoring of many countries including Taiwan, South Korea,
Haiti, Thailand, Indonesia, Zambia, Chile and El Salvador. The 
continuation of OPIC programs in such countries sends a symbolic 
message to oppressive regimes that the United States tolerates 
the denial of basic human and worker rights with a ’'business as 
usual11 attitude.73 There is also a concern that U.S. firms would 
be taking advantage of a "stable work force" in such countries 
that is induced by threats and repressive government tactics. In 
1987, OPIC programs were suspended in Paraguay, Romania, Nicargua
and Ethopia, and in Chile in 1988.M
In accordance with OPIC's statutes, it can not assist 
investments that might have a significant adverse effect on the 
U.S. economy or employment, such as "runaway" plants that 
transfer production facilities to countries with cheap labor.
OPIC screens each investment proposal to determine these probable 
impacts and then monitors some projects to verify the effects.
In the four years from 1985 through 1988, OPIC formally rejected 
43 projects which appeared to be detrimental to the U.S. 
economy.75 In addition to its own in-house evaluations, OPIC has 
contracted studies by independent firms to analyze the effects of 
its projects, all which have concluded that OPIC-sponsored 
business ventures have positive domestic employment effects and 
export promotion.
Organized labor organizations refute these findings, and 
have strongly opposed OPIC's operations when it comes before
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Congress for reauthorization. They critize OPIC's reliance upon 
investor-supplied projections and data when evaluating the impact 
of possible investments on U.S. domestic employment, rather than 
collecting information from government and independent sources as 
well as company records. "It is OPIC’s responsibility, not the 
investor's, to make judgements in accordance with the law."76 
OPIC's findings are misleading because they fail to assess the 
employment impact if the investment had never been made at all, 
or if it had been made in the U.S. instead.77 In 1985, Congress 
ordered a study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) to examine 
the impact of OPIC projects upon American jobs. The results, 
released in May, 1987, were not favorable for OPIC. In summary, 
the report concluded:
GAO found that some OPIC-assisted projects have 
direct negative impacts on U.S. trade and potentially 
negative impacts on U.S. employment. OPIC's 
methodology for computing economic empact in the 
United States of the projects it assists obscures the 
direct effect of these projects and results in overly 
optimistic reports to the Congress regarding the 
magnitude of economic benefits to the United States.
OPIC needs comprehensive policies and procedures for 
use in its projects screening and monitoring 
functions.78
An earlier 1985 investigation by the House Government Operations 
Committee similarly found OPIC's screening and monitoring of 
projects inadaquate because the agency was negligent in obtaining 
"crucial information".79
Labor organizations have also appeared/testified before OPIC 
public hearings to reiterate their complaints. Citing the 
results of the GAO study, a representative of the United
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Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America (UAW) criticized the questionable practices used to 
assess the U.S. employment effects of OPIC projects and insisted 
that Mthe interests of the multinational firms recieve the 
support of the U.S. government, while U.S. production and
employment suffer.”80 He added that ”the use of limited staff 
time and short term employees to make the employment calculations 
show the low priority OPIC assigns to the continued employment 
and welfare of American workers.”01
A written testimony submitted to the public hearings by the 
New York state AFL-CIO advocated terminating OPIC operations 
because of the export of American jobs. In support of this, the 
statement draws upon the findings of the GAO study and an 
investigation by the House Government Operations Committee. It 
also cites many examples of corporations in New York state which 
received OPIC assistance to start operations in less-developed 
countries while closing plants and terminating thousands of state 
workers. For example, Black 6 Decker Corporation received $1.25 
million insurance for a project in Singapore impacting 1,250 
workers who lost their jobs when the New York plants closed. 
Between 1981-86, General Electric received insurance covering 
over $164 million while 7,000 New York State employees were 
terminated from their jobs.82
The development research team of Elliott and Victoria Morss 
confirm this trend of exporting jobs and expect it to continue to 
worsen in the future. They contend that the lower cost of labor,
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ease of technology transfer and increasing political stability of 
LDCs and the stagnating markets of Western nations will shift the 
heavy industry production base to the growing markets of Asia and 
Latin America. "The consequent loss of jobs in Europe and North
America could reach staggering numbers."*3
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OPIC’s Business Interests Override Development
and Other Concerns
OPIC’s perfunctory response to these labor concerns is a 
clear demonstration of how the agency minimizes the significance 
of and subordinates other issues for the priority of assisting 
American business. Even though mounting labor union pressures 
nearly succeeded in eliminating the agency when it came up for 
congressional reauthorization in 1977, OPIC prevailed with the 
broad support and powerful backing of business interests. One 
N e w  York Times journalist who covers OPIC activities and related 
topics observed that OPIC ’faces a general disenchantment with 
anything smacking of foreign aid and the perception that its 
activities subsidize multinational corporations and help them 
export jobs.”04
OPIC programs are dominated by large, multinational 
corporations and fail to appropriately address the need for small 
business investment in the Third World. Small ventures are 
acknowledged to be far more developmental for the host country 
than large industrial projects. In poor countries lacking 
relevant examples of industrialization, they serve as better, 
more feasible models for local entrepreneurs to emulate. Small 
foreign businesses tend to be highly labor-intensive and less 
capital-intensive. They involve technology and management 
techniques better suited to the needs of LDCs. Their size
typically permits them to adapt to local cultural conditions ai t 
integrate with the host community better than large industrial 
projects.
Even though OPIC offers special programs specifically to 
attract small business, they do not appear to have much impact.
It is certainly understandable that large corporations would 
account for most of the capital resources commited to OPIC 
projects in light of the capital-intensive projects they tend to 
establish. In 1988, OPIC boasted that small business accounted 
for one-third of its projects.85 While this percentage may appear 
substantial, a closer examination of "small" reveals a definition 
so broad that it encompasses many large companies and hardly 
focuses on those small ventures most appropriate for developing 
countries. OPIC's definition of small business translates 
roughly as firms having revenues or net worth less than that of 
the smallest firm listed on the “Fortune 1000."86 Stated 
differently, this indicates that more than two-thirds of OPIC 
programs are enjoyed by the largest, multinational corporations.
OPIC has not been succ ssful in attracting business 
investments <o the very poorest countries which need assistance 
the most. John Sewell of the Overseas Development Council 
observes that "U.S investment has been focused in particular 
areas of the world and is quite concentrated on a few countries 
that...are among the most advanced developing countries. Private 
investment so far has not been attracted to a large number of 
developing countries, particularly those in the lower income
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category.1187 Typically, these lack sufficient investment 
opportunities to attract private investors and have gained few 
benefits from movement of foreign private enterprise to the Third 
World. They do not have large markets for exports from 
industrial countries, nor do they supply many goods or resources 
to the developed world. For example, OPIC assisted only nine 
projects in seven African countries in 1987 and boasted a record 
seventeen projects in fourteen African countries the following 
year. This number for an entire continent contrasts sharply 
with the fifteen ventures in Korea, eighteen in Brazil, eleven in 
Argentina and five in Taiwan during 1988.88 These countries are 
considered among the advanced developing countries (ADCs). The 
economies of these countries typically have large sophisticated 
and diversed sectors and, in fact, wield considerable economic 
impact and competition upon the economies of industrial nationas. 
Little encouragement is actually needed from the U.S. government 
to attract investors, exporters or importers to these wealthier 
LDCs because their rapidly growing economies have developed a 
vigerous private sector and American corporations already carry 
on extensive activities there. So, OPIC's assistance to 
investments locating in these countries merely serves to add to 
corporate profits.
OPIC has also been "conviently" lax in enforcing the 
international worker rights provisions in countries that have 
particularly favorable investment climates for American business. 
Congressman Donald J. Pease, a member of the Ways amd Means
Committee and its Trade Subcommittee, expressed his suprise that 
OPIC assistance was not withdrawn from Chile for the violations 
of the Pinochet regime and chided them for maintaining programs 
there for an extra year. He pointed out that Mthis 
Administration has been willing to go to extreme lengths to 
minimize the law in order to sustain GSP (trade) and OPIC 
assistance...The determinations made in prior worker rights cases 
brought against South Korea and Chile, to cite two examples, call 
into question how committed the administration is to 
administering and enforcing the GSP and OPIC provisions regarding
worker rights.”89
The eligibility requirements and restrictions intended to 
insure development benefits for the host country represent a 
nominal barrier to business participation. An OPIC pamphlet 
describing the finance programs to attract potential investors 
qualified its eligibility requirements: "From time to time,
policies or statutory provisions exclude businesses from 
consideration for OPIC financial participation. Current examples 
include gambling facilities and projects producing munitions or 
alcoholic beverages.”90 Such an explanation hardly suggests 
rigorous development priorities if only such blatently 
detrimental and politically sensitive projects are typical 
examples of those excluded from OPIC assistance.
In response to such criticisms, OPIC officials insist that 
theirs is a development agency. In reference to the applications 
and criteria used to assess a company for OPIC loans or political
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risk insurance, Eric Luhmann, Manager of Pre-Investment Services, 
estimates that the development contributions account for about
75% of a proposed project's eligibility.91 As described earlier, 
the application review analyzes many factors of economic and 
social impact on the host community. OPIC assistance can be 
granted, however, even if only minimal development contributions 
are expected. OPIC's approach to economic development appears to 
be based on the assumption that the mere presence of a foreign 
business entity will generate economic benefits and growth in an 
underdeveloped country, and this cannot be assumed. Such an 
over-simplified definition of economic development is inadaquate 
because it fails to recognize that the economic, social, 
political and cultural facets of a country's development are 
inseparable. By the very nature of its activities, the 
development approach of OPIC concentrates upon economic growth. 
However, OPIC's passive avoidance of these broader social factors 
ignores the fact that the means of production and economic 
traditions of a country are too closely intertwined with its 
cultural fabric to disregard mutual considerations; the sole 
concentration of economic growth at the expense of the other 
factors of development is not only one-sided, but potentially 
counter-productive.
Many researchers emphasize that the social, cultural, and 
political factors should be given greater consideration in the 
initial planning of a development project, and later in the 
evaluation and analysis of its operations. Investment decisions
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are typically based upon information based upon macroeconomic 
data of the host country with little regard for the social and 
cultural character of the people. By including the expertise and 
advice of various social scientists, including anthropologists, 
sociologists, and perhaps even historians, OPIOsponsored 
investments could reflect the concerns of broader development 
impacts. Anthony Hall, a lecturer in Social Planning in 
Developing Countries at the London School of Economics cites the 
successful inclusion of cultural factors by Swedish development 
agencies: "perhaps the most outstanding example nf the official
use of sociological and anthrolopogical expertise is that of 
SIDA, the Swedish government's development agency, which 
maintains a close working relationship with academics through the 
Development Study Unit of the Department of Social Anthropology 
of the University of Stockholm."92 In addition to the advice of 
soda* scientists, the planning should also include the relevant 
input of the local host community, through civic and religious 
leaders as well as ordinary citizens. A committee of 
international development agencies acknowledged that development 
aid planning, determination of issues to be addressed and 
evaluations " o v e r w h e lm in g ly  r e f l e c t  e i t h e r  t h e  I n t e r e s t s  a n d  
c o n c e r n s  o f  d o n o r s or the interests and concerns of recipients as 
seen by the donors" (italics from original source). The 
interests of those who stand to be most directly affected by 
foreign private investment are rarely, if ever, consulted.
In addition to being developmentally considerate, the
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adaptation to cultural variations also accounts for good business 
planning. Disregarding social factors can be a major impediment 
to realizing the potential success of a foreign investment 
venture; cultural pecularities can determine work habits of 
local workers, affect their relationship with the foreign 
business, affect the use of resources, and force adjustments in 
the internal operations and management. The decision-making and 
planning stages of an overseas investment would no doubt include 
feasibility studies, market analyses and much research to 
guarantee the success of the project; it seems only appropriate 
to include similar sociological studies and local consultations 
in this process to assure compatibility with the local community 
and guard development benefits.
Regarding Accomodations to cultural factors during the 
planning stages of a project, Harvey Himberg, OPIC Director of 
Development Policy and Environmental Affairs, explained that 
"That isn't really our responsibility. I mean, we don't see our 
role as taking that kind of grass-roots approach to the projects. 
We believe that is left to the judgement of the host country. 
...It's their [the company's] project. To the extent that they 
implement the project as they proposed to, then the development 
benefits should follow."94 However, such cultural insensitivity 
can cause even the best project designs to suffer terrible losses 
and can actually inhibit local development. Even though OPIC 
requires approval of the host government for all projects, 
administrators in LDCs may typically be inadequate in evaluating
and advising an incoming business venture. Since many such 
officials are educated abroad or live in social conditions 
separate from much of the population, even they may need help in 
conducting a cultural appraisal of their own country.95 The 
political elite often have a vested interest of personal gain by 
allowing foreign investment to proceed and would hardly permit 
local community considerations to impede an incoming project.
OPIC is required by Congress to monitor projects as they 
become operational. Harvey Himberg describes it as an "audit 
function" where economic analysts go in the field "to confirm the 
economic data that the investor has given us at the outset."96 
These evaluations are based upon information supplied by the 
investors rather than independently gathered data. This is 
hardly a subjective source for the information that OPIC's impact 
assessments focus around. Monitoring is performed on a purely 
quantitative basis, examining economic indicators that fail to 
explore the qualitative social impacts resulting from the 
introduction of a foreign business operation. Eric Luhmann 
explains that, "we're looking at the economic benefits. We're sn 
economic development agency. The Agency for International 
Development [AID] would be concerned with the social aspects 
because they are a government-to-government-type assistance 
agency."97 Harvy Himberg explained that the size of the agency is 
also a limiting factor. Responding to a question about the 
inclusion of anthropoligical factors in OPIC evaluations, he 
explained that "we don't have the resources to go into that kind
S3
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of depth. We’d like to, but we’re a very small agency and we
have virtually no contracting budget.”98 So OPIC monitoring is 
typically limited to a narrow scope of quantitive measurements 
with little follow-up on qualitative community impact.
OPIC attempts to anticipate potential adverse effects from 
projects, especially environmental problems, and includes 
specific phrases in its contract with investors so that the 
agency can require mitigative measures. Mr. Himberg admits, 
however, that this depends upon OPIC's ability to anticipate 
potential problems: ”If the company has not falsely represented
to us what they were doing and the development impacts of the 
projects are unfavorable,.we can’t hold them to anything if we 
failed to perceive that the project had an adverse effect and we
all have to live with it.”99 Any initial emphasis on 
developmental contributions does not necessarily carry through 
the process of project implementation and operations. Once OPIC 
approves a business loan or insurance request, the onus of the 
developmental impact shifts to the private company and OPIC 
retains little authority to assure fulfillment of development 
objectives. OPIC influence to assure positive results is 
therefore limited and, since social repercussions are not 
considered, there is little provision at ail to accomodate and 
correct problems in this area.
This highlights a particular weakness in OPIC: the
insufficient leverage to pressure firmer compliance to 
development objectives or correct violations and abuses of the
agency's services. Even when OPIC monitoring reveals a project 
to be deficient, the agency has little recourse to take. 
Violations mcnifest in various degrees; "if an investor is doing 
something in blatent violation of a contract with OPIC," explains 
Harvey Himberg, "we can foreclose on a project. We can call a 
loan as any creditor could, or terminate insurance,"10° or, pursue 
criminal prosecution for default as in the John Hull case. 
However, OPIC doesn't appear to have much leverage to correct 
investor negligence, to counter less serious violations that 
don't warrent legal action yet should be corrected, for example 
inadaquate health facilities or a superficially implemented 
training program. While OPIC is not a regulatory agency, its 
distinct lack of enforcement favors business interests at the 
detriment of development concerns.
Although OPIC considers itself a development agency, an 
assessment of its operations fails to reveal a deep commitment to 
the needs of Third World nations. As demonstrated here, OPIC 
functions on a narrow interpretation of development, 
insufficiently emphasizes this during project planning stages, 
and lacks leverage to insure that development expectations carry 
through to the host community. The impetus behind OPIC 
operations lie elsewhere— development concerns are often 
subordinated to other interests including foreign policy 
objectives and investment incentives. The initiatives to alter 
and improve OPIC programs and operations have almost solely 
focused upon increasing business participation by improving
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benefits for investors, yet increasing the quantity of busine33 
Inputs does not translate into improved development impacts.
Concluding Remarks
Despite the criticisms and shortcomings of OPI 
activities, the agency still has the ent ial f a >: st L! s
with development benefits from the introduction at foreign 
private enterprise. The agency screens investors applying for 
assistance and selects those with potential employment, new 
technology and foreign exchange earnings for the host country.
The development efforts of LDCs and the profit goals of foreign 
investors are not mutually exclusive and there is a common ground 
where each can benefit from the other. The fact that 
multinational corporations increase their profit margins should 
not be seen as a drawback in a development aid program; altruism 
is not required as the motivation behind development efforts as 
long as true benefits result for the host community. According 
to John Sewell of the Overseas Development Council, "it is 
important to remember that the goal is equitable, broad-based 
development of the LDCs and to assess potential contributions of
the U.S. private sector from that perspective.”101 Foreign 
private enterprise continues to be a source of crucial resources 
for LDCs and a viable vehicle for their delivery.
A Senate review committee in the early 1970s considered 
shifting the focus of OPIC to only offer assistance to investment 
ventures which significantly benefit the development of the host 
country. Ihis option was rejected, however, based upon the
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experience of a comparable Swedish program that had strict 
devel' pment criteria in its contracts with private business.
Eve** though it offered low rates for insurance premiums, this 
Swedish program had been unsuccessful in convincing investors to 
accept its strict standards.102 In order to maintain the 
attractiveness of its programs, OPIC must compromise its 
development principles and forfeit project criteria in order to 
avoid impeding upon the profit margins of potential investors. 
Concessions are evident throughout OPIC's programs and 
activities: in the simplified development criteria for potential
investors and the insufficient monitoring of operationing 
projects. The agency's disregard for the cultural impacts of 
investments, its concentration of large, multinational 
corporations and its lax response to worker rights violations 
further shows OPIC's neglect of development issues to the benefit 
of investment incentives. This trade-off demonstrates that 
OPIC's development assistance and investment promotion efforts 
are not wholly compatible.
The divergent objectives of OPIC exemplifies just one of the 
many inconsistencies of U.S. foreign policy. OPIC's selective 
application of regulations and the political reasons behind many 
of its actions reveals the fluid standards and lack of conformity 
in U.S. international actions. Egypt was selected for the first 
OPIC telemission in 1982, a special favor by the new Reagan 
Administration that reflected this country's high priority in 
U.S. foreign policy. As the second largest recipient of U.S
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foreign assistance, this reflects a decision based more upon 
Egypt’s geo-strategic importance than its needy status. OPIC 
cites human rights violations for revoking its programs in 
Nicaragua while the Administration is silent about worse abuses 
by South Africa and continues to support the Apartheid regime. 
The Chinese government crackdown and massacre during recent 
student demonstrations met with mild reproach and sanctions from 
Washington, yet less-atrocious events in the Soviet Union have 
yielded harsh measures and denunciations. Needless to say, 
China's market of over a billion potential consumers has 
attracted many U.S. corporations— OPIC assisted eleven ventures
there in 1988, a considerable number.103 Despite the student 
slayings, OPIC programs have not been withdrawn because such a 
move would be economically detrimental to the United States.104 
Even OPIC itself represents an insufficient approach by U.S. 
foreign policy to emphasize market mechanisms in LDCs. A more 
comprehensive approach would address trade policies, interest 
rates, export financing, etc., to support the private sectors of 
LDCs and provide better export opportunities which are a crucial 
source of foreign currency earnings for these debt-burdened 
nations.105 This selective approach, however, demonstrates 
Washington's narrow international economic concerns and reflects 
the broader disparities in American foreign efforts.
OPIC has come under criticism as an altruistic cover for 
ulterior domestic and foreign policy objectives. Third World 
development, ideally a humanitarian concern, is subordinated to
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the profit interests of U.S. corporations. According to many 
critics this occurs not only in OPIC, but corporate interests 
dominate the range of American development assistance efforts. 
Frances Moore Lapp6, a well-known researcher of development 
issues, notes that "while third world economies become burdened 
with ever heavier debts, the primary stimulation aid provides is 
to increase sales of a relative handful of corporations in the 
'donor' countries."106 She observes that in their appeals to 
Congress for yearly funding, federal aid agencies boast the value 
of foreign aid to U.S. business and the American economy.107 
About three out of every four dollars in the U.S. AID budget are 
returned to the American economy to purchase products and 
services.108 In addition to these immediate short-term returns, 
U.S. bilateral aid also secures long-term benefits for American 
business by fostering future customers in LDC markets for U.S. 
exports. OPIC is an additional example of how U.S. development 
aid serves the interests of American corporations.
This is not to suggest that investment incentive programs 
are an inappropriate function of the U.S. government. The role 
of encouraging and protecting U.S. overseas investments 
constitutes a legitimate concern that the federal government 
should be involved in if it is deemed within the national 
interest (and it is). The majority of other industrialized 
countries offer similar incentive programs to their industries 
and businesses.109 However, whether these incentive mechanisms 
should be considered a development tool is questionable. The
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programs offered by other governments generally do not have a 
development pretext. While concerns for the potential 
contributions of American private enterprise to LDCs are not lost 
among the investment incentives of OPIC, the agency’s focus 
unquestionably settles upon U.S. economic benefits. The 
regulations and development criteria of OPIC assume a passive 
role and function more as preventive me«oures to avoid assisting 
projects of an obviously detrimental nature than an active 
promotion of development contributions.
It is difficult to determine how effective OPIC actually is 
in stimulating new investments in the Third World. An 
international survey of official investment promotion programs 
admits that "governments can relatively easily apply restrictive 
controls on overseas investment,...but to exert a positive 
influence on investors with directly evident effects is much more
difficult.”110 According to U.S. development reports, the United 
States constitutes the single largest source of direct investment 
flows to LDCs, accounting for roughly half the total flows from 
industrial to developing countries.111 What credit can OPIC take 
for promoting these flows? Its impact is unsure. Some contend 
that the availability of OPIC assistance is a decisive factor in 
overseas investment decisions, especially those involving small 
businesses or high-risk regions.112 But business operates 
according to profit motives and this will serve as the ultimate 
determinant in a venture. This emphasis on bottom-line profits 
explains the domination of large multinational corporations in
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OPIC projects and their preference for wealthier LDCs. Many 
insist that the overwhelming majority of overseas investments 
would occur even without OPIC assistance. Investors would assume 
political risks themselves and seek financing from the private 
sector, just as they must do in any other venture. The 
availability of OPIC programs reduces their risk factors and 
either makes clients lax in their investments or serves to
subsidize and increase their profits.113
OPIC juggles so many mandates and concerns that successful
accomplishments in all these areas is rare or highly doubtful.
OPIC president Craig Nalen closed the agency's 1987 public
hearings with the following comment:
"OPIC has a very, very complex mandate to follow. We 
are at one and the same time an agency which Congress 
has directed to assist in the development process of 
the third world countries, and we are an agency which 
Congress has directed to promote U.S. trade and 
investment and to help America's business community, to 
keep it competitive with other developed nations. We 
are expected to accomplish all of this with very 
limited resources and, on top of that, to operate on a 
self-sustaining basis."114
Yet, as this study has demonstrated, OPIC's mandate is not only 
complex, but there appears to be inherent contradictions within 
OPIC operations and its numerous concerns. An international 
economist for the A.F.L.-C.I.O. challenged OPIC's claims of 
promoting trade for LDCs: "For many of these projects, OPIC
noted that a principal benefit would be increased foreign 
exchange earnings on the part of the host country. Will that 
foreign exchange benefit be earned from the U.S. in the form of 
increased exports to this country?".115 OPIC's Fiscal 1988
63
Development Report cited a poultry production center, Agro-Tech 
International, as a model investment which provides employment 
opportunities and poultry for the local market of the Dominican 
Republic.116 However, a different source revealed that this 
facility, one of the largest poultry producers in the country, 
imported all its equipment, feed mixes, vaccines, spare parts, 
etc. from the U.S., in effect producing "imported chickens."117 
Although it was singled-out by OPIC for its development 
contributions, this project realizes far more benefits for the 
American investor and the U.S. economy than for the Dominican 
Republic. As has already been demonstrated, the foreign policy 
objectives served by OPIC programs also can undermine development 
contributions. Considering the numerous and often conflicting 
concerns that OPIC is supposed to accomodate, including Third 
World development, U.S. investment promotion, U.S. labor effects, 
environmental impacts, prudent insurance risk management, human 
rights, the American economy, etc., it is little wonder that OPIC 
cannot balance them all and they inevitably conflict.
As with any government operation, bureau, or, indeed, any 
private organization, there are various constituents whose 
demands must be met and different concerns to be considered. The 
various interests affected by OPIC and, in turn, affecting its 
operations, lie both inside and outside the government. Within 
the federal structure, Congress attaches ammendments to OPIC 
authorizations that add new regulations or administrative 
policies. Individual congressmen who represent large labor
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districts scrutinize OPIC actions and put up agressive efforts to 
restrict or disolve the agency. A president's foreign policy 
interests can dictate OPIC's assistance for support of the 
Aluminum industry or for an American supplier of the Nicaraguan 
Contra forces. State Department long-term efforts may determine 
OPIC decisions, such as conducting the first telemission to 
Egypt. In the private sector, of course corporate interests 
yield considerable influence and OPIC is closely allied with the 
American business community. Manufactoring sectors dependant 
upon international trade are highly supportive of OPIC programs, 
while many labor-intensive industries fault the agency with 
exporting jobs. And, of course somewhere along the way, the 
needy masses of LDCs also have vested interests in OPIC 
activities and their concerns are also taken into consideration.
A study of OPIC becomes a typical study of power, interest 
group politics and decision-making. In his discusion of the 
basics of political economy, Robert Gilpin states that "politics 
largely determines the framework of economic activity and 
channels it in directions intended to serve the interests of 
dominant groups.”118 The political climate of Washington dictates 
that the economic focus of OPIC lies in the needs and priorities 
of American business. These private dealings and foreign policy 
objectives override the concerns of Third World development 
assistance. Advocates for less-developed countries suffer the 
distinct lack of influence in these decisions, disadvantaged 
often by physical distance from Washington D.C. as well as
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insufficient clout and lobbying funds. Instead, their interests 
are considered from the desks of U.S. government officials. It 
is not difficult to understand that development considerations 
are easily drowned out by the big money, loud voices and vigorous 
lobbying of American big business. In a sense, the development 
potential of OPIC-assisted projects is subordinated at two 
levels: in the administration of OPIC programs and in the
decisions by individual investors that are guided by profit 
marg* ns.
OPIC operations center around attracting U.S. business to 
overseas locations and protecting their investments. In his 
final statement as OPIC president in the 1988 Annual Report 
before his replacement by an appointee of President Bush, Craig 
Nalen commented that "Above all, OPIC has never lost sight of 
whom it is we serve. In the final analysis, the Corporation’s 
success depends upon the satisfaction of its 'customers,' the 
American business community."119 Here lies the priorities of the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Even OPIC*s development 
•formula" is continger upon the participation of American 
business in OPIC programs to realize development outputs. Any 
benefits to the host community that result from this may almost 
be considered as favorable side-effects to the primary aim of 
introducing GPIC-sponsored investment into less-developed 
countries. The agency’s focus upon assisting American business 
became more concentrated during the Reagan Administration as the 
role of private enterprise was emphasized in development aid
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policy and business interests in general were highlighted. As 
the international business climate continues to become more 
competitive, one can expect the demand for incentive and 
protection programs like the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation to grow and the development aspects gradually wittled 
away.
Note: With the entrance of the new administration, things look
favorable for OPIC. The new president, Fred M. Zeder, is a 
Republican from New York and a personal friend of President 
Bush's. The agency hopes that these closer ties with the 
Executive Branch will bring a lessening of restrictions and 
restore some flexibility in the administration of OPIC programs. 
In addition, as of June 29, OPIC had not received insurance 
claims from any of the 32 projects that it is currently insuring 
in China, though investment inquiries for that country have
understandably ceased.120
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